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Can We Keep This Dirty Money?: Ponzi Scheme Transfers and
the Fourth Circuit's Vague but Workable Standard in In re
Derivium Capital, LLC'

INTRODUCTION

The term "Ponzi scheme" derives from the notorious 1920s con
artist, Charles Ponzi, but its use has boomed since the recession
began in 2008.2 In recent years, Ponzi schemes have been commonly
associated with Bernie Madoff, who robbed investors of nearly $50
billion.' While Madoff's fraudulent scheme was the largest in United
States history,4 Ponzi schemes have not disappeared and parties
continue to bring notable Ponzi scheme cases in courts across the
country.'
The start of the recession in 2008 forced the unraveling of a
record number of Ponzi schemes. When a Ponzi scheme is

* @ 2014 Kristen J. Kenley.
1. See Peter S. Kim, Note, Navigating the Safe Harbors: Two Bright Line Rules to
Assist Courts in Applying the Stockbroker Defense and the Good Faith Defense, 2008
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 657,673 n.68. Charles Ponzi operated a scheme that promised quick
riches for investors, which collapsed when a Boston newspaper declared Ponzi to be
insolvent, thus resulting in an investigation of Ponzi's business and the unraveling of his
fraud. See id.; see also Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1924) (detailing the collapse
of Ponzi's fraudulent scheme).
2. See Gary D. Halbert, Record Year for Ponzi Schemes, INVESTOR INSIGHT (Jan.
19, 2010, 4:21 PM), http://www.investorsinsight.com/blogs/forecaststrends/archive/2010
/01/19/record-year-for-ponzi-schemes.aspx (explaining that almost 150 fraudulent schemes
were uncovered in 2009, which was nearly four times the number of Ponzi schemes
uncovered in 2008).
3. See, e.g., Stephen Gandel, Wall Street's Latest Downfall: Madoff Charged with
Fraud, TIME (Dec. 12, 2008), http://content.timecom/time/business/article/0,8599
,1866154,00.html (describing the Madoff scandal as "a massive Ponzi scheme"); Jordan
Maglich, Madoff Ponzi Scheme, Five Years Later, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2013, 10:30 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jordanmaglich/2013/12/09/madoff-ponzi-scheme-five-yearslater/ ("While Charles Ponzi's namesake scheme had given the fraud its name back in the
1920's, Madoff's arrest quickly transformed 'Ponzi scheme' into a household word.").
4. See DENIS COLLINS, Case Study: Bernie Madoff's Ponzi Scheme, in BUSINESS
ETHICS: HOW TO DESIGN AND MANAGE ETHICAL ORGANIZATIONS 435, 435 (2011),

availableat http://dcollins.faculty.edgewood.edulpdfdocuments/Madoff%2OCase.pdf.
5. See Constance Parten, After Madoff. Most Notable Ponzi Scams, CNBC,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/41722418 (last updated Apr. 18, 2011).
6. See, e.g., Busted Ponzi Schemes Quadrupled in 2009, CBS NEWS (Dec. 28, 2009,
4:20 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/busted-ponzi-schemes-quadrupled-in-2009/
(estimating that the recession unraveled nearly four times the number of scams in 2009
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uncovered, it is likely to become the subject of various legal
proceedings.' In addition to criminal and civil suits, the scheme's
crash often results in the operating enterprise's bankruptcy, thus
subjecting the entity to bankruptcy proceedings.' The primary
purpose of these bankruptcy proceedings is to recover money to
repay the bankrupt enterprise's creditors.9 However, there are
limitations to carrying out this goal. Notably, Congress created an
exception to the transactions that can be returned to creditors, also
known as avoidance, by enacting § 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code
("Code"), the stockbroker safe harbor provision ("stockbroker
defense"). 0 Under § 546(e), "[a] trustee may not avoid a transfer that
is a ... settlement payment . .. made by or to (or for the benefit of) a
. . . stockbroker."" Thus, § 546(e) immunizes transfers that qualify as

"settlement payments" made from the debtor to a stockbroker,
thereby preventing avoidance of those transfers and lessening the
amount that can be repaid to creditors. 2 However, an exception to
the exception exists: transactions made to a stockbroker that normally
would receive protection under § 546(e) may be avoided and returned
to creditors if the debtor in bankruptcy fraudulently transferred the
money involved.13
Courts have reached incongruous results in applying § 546(e)'s
stockbroker defense. The discord begins with defining the terms
than 2008); Parten, supra note 5 ("In all, more than 150 Ponzi schemes collapsed in 2009,
compared to about 40 in 2008 .... ").
7. See R. ALEXANDER PILMER, RICHARD L. WYNNE & MARK T. CRAMER,
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, KIRKLAND ALERT: IN THE WAKE OF COLLAPSE:
APPROACHES TO PONZI SCHEME LITIGATION 1-2 (Feb. 2009) [hereinafter KIRKLAND
ALERT], available at http://www.kirkland.comlsiteFiles/Publications/BFA6C410069121
A85A79531FF51D5509.pdf. Defrauded investors are also likely to bring civil claims
against the Ponzi scheme operators. See id.
8. See id.
9. See Menchise v. Akerman Senterfitt, 532 F.3d 1146, 1151 (11th Cir. 2008) ("The
main purposes of bankruptcy law are to collect all of the assets and liabilities of an entity,
to pay the creditors of the bankrupt to the fullest extent possible, and to give the debtor a
fresh start.").
10. See Act of July 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-222, § 4, 96 Stat. 235, 236 (1982) (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2012)) (amending § 546 of title 11 by adding subsection
(d), which prohibits a trustee from avoiding a transfer that is a margin payment or a
settlement payment); Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-353, § 351(2), 98 Stat. 333, 358 (redesignating subsection 546(d) as subsection
546(e)).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2012).
12. See id.
13. See id. § 548(a)(1)(A) ("The trustee may avoid any transfer ... incurred by the
debtor ... if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily ... made such transfer or incurred such
obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.").
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contained in the statute.14 Some courts have applied the safe harbor
broadly while others limit its application to public market
transactions only." In a matter of first impression for the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the court in Grayson Consulting, Inc. v.
Wachovia Securities, LLC (In re Derivium CapitalLLC) 16 expanded
the application of the stockbroker defense to protect commissions,
fees, and margin payments paid to a brokerage firm even though the
underlying transfers were made in connection with an alleged Ponzi
scheme.17 In addition, the court held that the commission payments at
issue must be reasonable and customary in the industry in order to
qualify as "settlement payments." No other appellate court has
taken either approach." As a result, the Fourth Circuit established a
new standard in stockbroker defense law that not only allows
commission payments to be shielded from avoidance under § 546(e),
but also holds that these payments must be reasonable and customary
in the industry.
This Recent Development proceeds in four parts. Part I begins
with a background discussion of the Code's stockbroker safe harbor
provision and then examines the varying approaches courts have
taken in applying this exception to the avoidance power of trustees in
bankruptcy proceedings. Part II focuses on the facts and holding of
Derivium Capital and describes how the Fourth Circuit broadly
applied the stockbroker defense in the context of an alleged Ponzi
scheme. Part III discusses the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Derivium
Capital, arguing that while the court's ruling to extend § 546(e) to
include commissions shown to be reasonable and customary in the
industry was vague, this shortcoming should be adequately rectified
through subsequent case law. Part III also argues that the court
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. See infra Part I.B (describing differences in circuit courts' application of the
defense). The Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits define "settlement
payments" broadly to include both public and private market transactions, see infra notes
42-43 and accompanying text, while the Ninth Circuit and a few district courts take the
"public market" approach, see infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. The Eleventh
Circuit has not specifically adopted a public market approach, but it has indicated its
willingness to only apply § 546(e) to public market transactions by applying the
stockbroker defense very narrowly. See infra note 37.
16. 716 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2013).
17. See id. at 364-65.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 363 n.6 ("It appears that there are no cases expressly addressing whether
§ 546(e) immunizes commissions."); Richard L. Costella & Kristen M. Siracusa,
FraudulentConveyance Law and the Stockbroker Defense, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16, 64
(2013).
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correctly declined to add an extra-statutory Ponzi scheme exception
to the stockbroker defense because it would be unnecessary and
would disrupt the balance between the goals of securities and
bankruptcy law. Part IV provides insight into the possible
implications of Derivium Capital and urges courts to use caution
when applying a broad definition of "settlement payment" in order to
provide consistency and clarity to an ambiguous and convoluted
doctrine.
I. SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS: THE STOCKBROKER DEFENSE
A.

Background

Under the Code, an entity's filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy
triggers the liquidation process.2 0 Upon an entity entering liquidation
in bankruptcy, the U.S. Trustee or a creditor assigns a trustee to the
entity,2 1 and this trustee has certain powers and tasks.22 One of the
trustee's main responsibilities is to collect the debtor's assets,
liquidate them, and distribute the proceeds among its creditors.2 3 To
carry out this task, the Code provides bankruptcy trustees the
authority to "avoid" certain transfers and obligations the debtor
made prior to the bankruptcy proceeding.2 4 In doing so, the trustee
can "claw back" certain assets to be returned to the debtor's
creditors.25
However, the trustee's power to avoid transactions and return
the assets to the debtor's creditors is not without limitation. Section
546(e) of the Code provides a crucial limitation that "the trustee may
20. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784 (2012). See generally Chapter 7: Liquidation Under the
Bankruptcy Code, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy
/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter7.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (explaining the Chapter 7
liquidation process).
21. See§§701,702.
22. See id. § 704; see also BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 1656 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a
trustee in the bankruptcy context as "a person appointed by the U.S. Trustee or elected by
creditors or appointed by a judge to administer the bankruptcy estate during a bankruptcy
case," whose duties include "collecting and reducing to cash the assets of the estate" and
"investigating the debtor's financial affairs"); Samuel P. Rothschild, Note, Bad Guys in
Bankruptcy: Excluding Ponzi Schemes from the Stockbroker Safe Harbor,112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1376, 1379-80 (2012) (discussing a trustee's powers in a bankruptcy proceeding).
23. See § 704.
24. Id. § 544.
25. Rothschild, supra note 22, at 1380. For an in-depth discussion of the term "claw
back" as it relates to Ponzi schemes, see generally Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong,
Clawbacks: Prospective ContractMeasures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation
and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368 (2009).
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not avoid a transfer that is a ... settlement payment ... made by or to
... a stockbroker." 26 In other words, the trustee does not have the
power to claw back a payment the debtor made to a stockbroker or if
the debtor itself is a stockbroker.27 Thus, the stockbroker defense
becomes an exemption from the avoidance provision of the Code,
thereby limiting the power of the bankruptcy trustee to return assets
to creditors.28
By enacting this safe harbor provision for stockbrokers, Congress
aimed to prevent the insolvency of one financial institution from
spreading to other institutions and threatening the collapse of the
financial market. 29 That is, Congress did not want a major bankruptcy
of one firm to have a "domino effect" and negatively affect the
financial industry as whole.30 Ultimately, this safe harbor provision
exists as a tool to promote stability within the financial market."
Even though the stockbroker defense appears to be
straightforward, courts have struggled to apply the defense
consistently. This difficulty begins with the definition of "settlement
payment" as used in § 546(e). The Code defines "settlement
payment" as "a preliminary settlement payment, a partial settlement
payment, an interim settlement payment, a settlement payment on
account, a final settlement payment, or any other similar payment
commonly used in the securities trade."32 Unfortunately, this
definition is circular in nature-it defines "settlement payment" only

26. § 546(e). "Stockbroker" is defined as one who is "engaged in the business of
effecting transactions in securities." Id. § 101(53A)(B).
27. See Rothschild, supra note 22, at 1380.
28. See id.
29. See H.R. REP. No. 97-420, at 2 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583-84.
The House Judiciary Committee summarized the purpose of the provision:
The amendments will ensure that the avoiding powers of a trustee are not
construed to permit margin or settlement payments to be set aside except in cases
of fraud and that, except as otherwise provided, the stay provisions of the Code
are not construed to prevent brokers from closing out the open accounts of
insolvent customers or brokers. The prompt closing out or liquidation of such
open accounts freezes the status quo and minimizes the potentially massive losses
and chain reactions that could occur if the market were to move sharply in the
wrong direction.
Id.
30. See id.
31. See Kim, supra note 1, at 663; cf H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 3, 20, 131, 132 (2005),
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89, 105, 191, 192 (noting that one goal of the
Bankruptcy Code is to reduce "systemic risk" in the marketplace).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (2012).
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by reference to other undefined "settlement payment[s]."33 One court
described the definition as "cryptic" because "[e]ssentially, it provides
that a settlement payment is a settlement payment."' Thus, the
definition gives courts little guidance about whether or not a specific
transaction would qualify under the definition. Courts are therefore
left to interpret the statute on their own and try to do so while
maintaining Congress's goals in enacting this provision."5
B. How Courts Apply the Stockbroker Defense
Given that the Code provides a circular definition for the term
"settlement payment," it is not surprising that courts have adopted
divergent methods to interpreting the stockbroker defense in
bankruptcy avoidance proceedings. When applying the stockbroker
defense, courts usually focus on its legislative history or how
"settlement payments" are understood in the context of the securities
industry.36 Regardless of the method employed, courts continuously
disagree about how expansive the definition is itself.
In one camp, a minority of courts has applied a "public market"
approach, which defines the term "settlement payment" narrowly.
33. See id.; see also Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V. v. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. (In re
Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.) (Enron Creditors 1), 422 B.R. 423, 433-34 (S.D.N.Y.
2009), affd, Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V. (Enron CreditorsII),
651 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2011) (recognizing the circularity of the definition).
34. Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital Fund, 218 B.R. 656, 675 (D.R.I. 1998).
35. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc.
v. Lattman (In re Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc.), 367 B.R. 68, 76-77 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2007) (defining the term "settlement payment" in light of Congress's purpose in enacting
§ 546(e)).
36. See Enron Creditors II, 651 F.3d at 345-46 (pointing to the congressional goals of
"preventing a 'race to the courthouse' and ensuring equality of distribution among
creditors" and applying these goals in evaluating the lower court's decision); Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 849 (10th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that its
interpretation of "'settlement payment' ... is consistent with the way 'settlement' is
defined in the securities industry"); Norstan Apparel Shops, 367 B.R. at 76 ("[In the
context of the legislative history of these provisions, the modifying phrase at the end of
§ 741(8) must be understood, at a minimum, to mean that in order to be encompassed in
the statutory definition of 'settlement payment,' a transaction must involve the public
securities markets."). Whether courts focus on legislative intent, context in the industry, or
both does not appear to be contested extensively.
37. See, e.g., Kipperman v. Circle Trust F.B.O. (In re Grafton Partners, L.P.), 321 B.R.
527, 538-40 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) ("[C]ommon elements in decisions finding that there is
not a protected settlement payment are that the securities involved are not publicly traded
and public markets are not utilized."); Norstan Apparel Shops, 367 B.R. at 76-77 (defining
a "settlement payment" as "a transaction ... involv[ing] the public securities market");
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Asea Brown Boveri, Inc. (In re Grand Eagle
Cos.), 288 B.R. 484, 494 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003) (refusing to expand the definition of
"settlement payment" to include all payments "for the purchase and sale of privately held
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These courts largely agree that the Code defines "settlement
payment" broadly but refuse to extend its application outside of the
public market." That is, these courts generally require the transaction
to involve the formal clearance and settlement process, and for the
transfer to be of a publicly traded security in a public market. 39 This
view implies that avoidance of a non-public transaction typically
would not be of enough significance that it could disrupt the financial
market.40 In this view, the sole purpose behind § 546(e) is to stabilize
the financial market; therefore, only transactions directly tied to this
purpose-public market transactions-should be excluded.4'
In contrast, most courts interpret the term "settlement payment"
broadly. 42 These courts focus on the plain language of the Code to
incorporate a variety of transactions into the definition.43 The
definition of "settlement payment" under § 741(8) concludes with the
phrase "or any other similar payment commonly used in the securities
stock [made] through a financial institution"). The Eleventh Circuit has narrowly applied
§ 546(e), but it did so by focusing on whether the transfer "was 'made by or to a
commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, or
securities clearing agency' " rather than narrowly defining "settlement payments."
Munford, Inc. v. Valuation Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604, 610 (11th
Cir. 1996) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (1988)).
38. See, e.g., Grafton Partners, 321 B.R. at 538-40 ("The transaction in question did
not occur on a public market and did not involve the process of clearing trades. This places
it within the pattern of cases that have concluded that a statutorily-protected 'settlement
payment' is not present.").
39. See Robert G. Richardson, Unsettled "Settlement Payments" in § 546(e), 27 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 12, 44 (2008) (citing Kapila v. Espirito Santo Bank (In re Bankest Capital
Corp.), 374 B.R. 333 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007); Norstan Apparel Shops, 367 B.R. 68).
40. See id. at 46.
41. See id.
42. For a commentary on this trend, see generally Christopher W. Frost, The
Continued Expansion of Section 546(e): Has the Safe Harbor Swallowed the Rule?, 31
BANKR. L. LETTER No. 10, at 1 (2011).
43. See Enron Creditors II, 651 F.3d 329, 334-35 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying the
stockbroker defense to an issuer's early redemption of commercial paper); Brandt v. B.A.
Capital Co. (In re Plassein Int'l Corp.), 590 F.3d 252, 257-59 (3d Cir. 2009) (extending its
previous definition of settlement payments to include transactions in privately held
securities); QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.), 571 F.3d 545, 549-50
(6th Cir. 2009) ("[N]othing in the text of § 546(e) precludes its application to settlement
payments involving privately held securities."); Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564
F.3d 981, 989 (8th Cir. 2009) (exempting payments exchanged for privately held stock as
settlement payments within in the meaning of § 546(e)); Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc.
(In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 514-15 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting the court's prior
recognition "that the definition [of 'settlement payment'] is extremely broad"); Jonas v.
Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Comark), 971 F.2d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 1992) ("We now join
with the Third and Tenth Circuits and broadly define the term settlement payment.");
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 848 (10th Cir. 1990)
(interpreting the definition of a "settlement payment" to include a transfer of
consideration in a leveraged buyout).
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trade."" Under the broad view, this phrase acts as a "catchall" to
include a wide range of transactions.45 In construing the term broadly,
courts do not differentiate between public and private securities; a
transaction will be classified as a "settlement payment" as long as it is
an ordinary securities transaction.46
C.

An Exception to the Exception: FraudulentTransfers and the
Effect of Ponzi Schemes

As noted, the Code provides a safe harbor for stockbrokers as an
exception to the trustee's power to avoid certain transactions made by
the debtor in bankruptcy.47 In addition, an exception to the
stockbroker defense exists for fraudulent transfers: a trustee can
avoid transfers made with "actual intent to ... defraud."4 8 Therefore,
even in the case of stockbroker transfers, trustees can reclaim assets
that occurred as a part of a fraudulent transfer and use the money to
pay the debtor's creditors.
One context in which fraudulent transfer claims arise is when
transfers are made in connection with a Ponzi scheme. The term
Ponzi scheme refers to "an investment fraud that involves the
payment of purported returns to existing investors from funds
contributed by new investors."4 9 Inherently, Ponzi schemes lack any
legitimate business and operate by distributing proceeds from new
investors to old investors, thus creating the misconception that the
enterprise is profitable.o Although Ponzi schemes can last years or
even decades, they ultimately crash whenever the operator fails to
recruit enough new investors to pay current ones." When this
inevitable collapse occurs, the Ponzi scheme operator or entity will
typically be subject to several legal proceedings.52 Federal prosecutors
44. 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (2012).
45. See Frost, 564 F.3d at 986 ("[T]he phrase follows a long list of various kinds of
settlement payments and so we think it is most naturally read as a catchall phrase intended
to underscore the breadth of the § 546(e) exemption.").
46. See, e.g., QSI Holdings, 571 F.3d at 550 ("[N]othing in the text of § 546(e)
precludes its application to settlement payments involving privately held securities.");
Frost, 564 F.3d at 986 ("Nothing in the relevant statutory language suggests Congress
intended to exclude these payments from the statutory definition of 'settlement payment'
simply because the stock at issue was privately held.").
47. See supra Part I.A.
48. See § 548(a)(1)(A).
49. Ponzi Schemes, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi
.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014); see Kim, supra note 1, at 673.
50. See Kim, supra note 1, at 673-74.
51. See KIRKLAND ALERT, supra note 7, at 1.
52. See id.

1378

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

usually bring criminal charges against the Ponzi scheme operator,53
but any related business enterprise will likely file for liquidation in
bankruptcy as well.54
The existence or allegation of a Ponzi scheme can affect the
availability of safe harbor provisions for stockbrokers in numerous
ways. For example, in bankruptcy proceedings, courts have created a
so-called "Ponzi scheme presumption." Under this approach, "the
finding of a Ponzi scheme creates a presumption of actual fraud as a
matter of law on all parties and transactions involved."" When the
Ponzi scheme presumption is applied, the court presumes that all
transactions are fraudulent for purposes of § 548(a)(1) and permits
trustees to avoid these transfers generally.56
However, in some scenarios, the Ponzi scheme presumption may
not allow avoidance of all Ponzi scheme transfers. For example,
because courts use the presumption to assume the presence of actual
fraud, the presumption may not apply in lawsuits against transferees
that received transfers from the fraudulent entity if the transferee can
establish its good faith." In addition, §548(a)(1) only applies to
53. See Benjamin B. Wagner, FinancialCrimes on Main Street Are as Devastatingas
Those on Wall Street, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/usao/briefingroom
/fin/investmentfraud.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
54. See KIRKLAND ALERT, supra note 7, at 1-2. Several dissolution proceedings may
occur, including Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") receivership, Securities
Investor Protection Corporation ("SIPC") liquidation, and bankruptcy. Id. Additionally,
the SEC may bring enforcement actions against individuals and entities for operating the
Ponzi scheme. See SEC Enforcement Actions Against Ponzi Schemes, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-ponzi.shtml (last updated Sept. 6, 2013).
55. Kim, supra note 1, at 674; see, e.g., Perkins v. Haines, 661 F.3d 623, 626 (11th Cir.
2011); Quilling v. Schonsky, 247 F. App'x 583, 586 (5th Cir. 2007); Christian Bros. High
Sch. Endowment v. Bayou No Leverage Fund, LLC (In re Bayou Group, LLC), 439 B.R.
284, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund
Ltd.), 397 B.R. 1, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Stoebner v. Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. (In re
Polaroid Corp.), 472 B.R. 22, 36 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2012); Liebersohn v. Campus Crusade
for Christ, Inc. (In re C.F. Foods, L.P.), 280 B.R. 103, 110 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2002).
56. See Craig T. Lutterbein, Note, "Fraudand Deceit Abound" but Do the Bankruptcy
Courts Really Believe Everyone Is Crooked: The Bayou Decision and the Narrowing of
"Good Faith," 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 405, 407-08 (2010); see also Mark A.
McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulentand PreferentialTransfers, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 157, 173-75 (1998) (providing an in-depth analysis of the relationship
between Ponzi schemes and fraudulent transfer claims). For an illustration of how a
party's assertion of the stockbroker defense can be adversely affected a court's application
of the Ponzi scheme presumption, see Kim, supra note 1, at 676-79. Academics have long
criticized the application of the Ponzi scheme presumption. While these criticisms are
beyond the scope of this Recent Development, for an example of how the Ponzi scheme
presumption may result in inequitable consequences, see Rothschild, supra note 22, at
1386-1402.
57. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (2012).
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transfers made within two years of the bankruptcy filing. 8 Therefore,
even if the Ponzi scheme presumption is applied and the presumption
of actual fraud is not rebutted, only transfers made two years before
the bankruptcy filing would be avoided. As a result, transfers made in
connection to early Ponzi scheme profits would not be returned to
creditors.59 Most recently, the Fourth Circuit addressed the
application of the stockbroker defense in the Ponzi scheme context in
Derivium Capital.
II. GRAYSON CONSULTING, INC. V. WACHOVIA SECURITIES, LLC (IN
RE DERIVIUM CAPITAL LLC)

FactualBackground and the Fourth Circuit'sRuling
Derivium Capital, LLC ("Derivium") was the debtor in a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding as the result of the collapse of its
"90% Stock-Loan Program," an alleged Ponzi scheme.' Under the
loan program, investors pledged publicly traded stock in exchange for
loans worth ninety percent of the stock's market value.6' At the end
of three years, "customers had the option of repaying the principal
plus interest and recovering the stock, surrendering the stock, or
refinancing the loan for an additional term." 62 The investors placed
their investments into Wachovia brokerage accounts under the
promise that Derivium would hedge their collateral using a
"confidential, proprietary formula." 63 Instead, Derivium instructed
Wachovia to liquidate the stock immediately." After liquidation,
Derivium's operators used the proceeds to fund customers' loans and
their own start-up ventures. When the loans matured, Derivium
could not return the stock to customers, prompting Wachovia to close
the accounts and Derivium to file for bankruptcy. 66 In 2007, the
A.

58. Id. § 548(a)(1).
59. See Rothschild, supra note 22, at 1378.
60. See Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Sec., LLC (In re Derivium Capital
LLC), 716 F.3d 355, 358-59 (4th Cir. 2013).
61. Id. at 359.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 358-59.
66. Id. at 358. Derivium originally filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Southern
District of New York, but that court converted the case to Chapter 7 and transferred it to
the District of South Carolina. Id. at 358-59. Kevin Campbell was appointed Derivium's
trustee, but Campbell assigned the claims to Grayson Consulting, Inc. ("Grayson"), which
purchased the Trustee's rights for $25,000 and was substituted as the plaintiff in December
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trustee filed tort' and avoidance claims' against Wachovia, seeking
the avoidance of "commissions, fees, and margin interest paid to
Wachovia" as fraudulent transfers under § 548(a)(1).6 9
At the bankruptcy court hearing, the court first considered
whether the commissions, fees, and margin interest payment
Derivium paid to Wachovia7 0 could be protected from recovery under
§ 546(e). 1 The court concluded that the transfers could be protected
if the commissions at issue were reasonable and customary in the
securities industry.72 After conducting a subsequent evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the commissions were reasonable and
customary in the industry, the court ruled that the commissions were
protected from avoidance under the stockbroker defense.73
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Grayson argued that § 546(e)
does not protect commissions, and even if it did, "Wachovia's
commissions ... were uncommonly low and therefore should have

been excluded from protection under the bankruptcy court's own
test."74 Specifically, Derivium received a sixty percent discount from
Wachovia's standard commission rate." In addition, Grayson
contended that Wachovia only conferred discounts on less than two
percent of its customers, thus the low commissions Derivium paid to

of 2007. Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Sec., LLC (In re Derivium Capital, LLC),
396 B.R. 184, 187-88 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008).
67. The tort claims were: "(1) aiding and abetting fraud; (2) aiding and abetting
breach of fiduciary duty; (3) aiding and abetting fraudulent conveyance; (4) aiding and
abetting conversion; (5) negligence; (6) breach of fiduciary duty; (7) conversion; (8) civil
conspiracy; and (9) constructive trust." Derivium Capital,716 F.3d at 359 n.3.
68. Id. at 359.
69. Id.
70. Derivium Capital, LLC is the debtor in bankruptcy and Bancroft Ventures
Limited ("Bancroft"), WITCO Services (UK) Ltd. ("WITCO"), and Optech Limited
("Optech") are considered "Stock Loan Entities." See Grayson Consulting, Inc. v.
Wachovia Sec., LLC (In re Derivium Capital, LLC), 437 B.R. 798, 802-03 (Bankr. D.S.C.
2010), aff'd, 716 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint
alleged that the owners and operators of Derivium Capital "exercised dominion and
control over the Stock Loan Entities" and that Derivium Capital "had brokerage accounts
with [Wachovia] in the name of [Derivium Capital] and in the names of the Stock Loan
Entities." Id. at 802, 804. As such, when this Recent Development refers to commissions
paid by Derivium, it includes those commissions paid by Bancroft, WITCO, and Optech.
71. Id. at 810-13.
72. See id.
73. Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Sec., LLC (In re Derivium Capital, LLC),
No. 5-15042, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 577, at *9 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011), aff'd, 716 F.3d 355 (4th
Cir. 2013).
74. Derivium Capital,716 F.3d at 363.
75. Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Sec., LLC (In re Derivium Capital, LLC),
No. 5-15042, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 577, at *6 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011).
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Wachovia were neither reasonable nor customary. 6 In contrast,
Wachovia argued that approximately fifty to seventy-five percent of
its clients received discounted commissions ranging anywhere from
five to ninety-five percent.
In one final attempt to avoid the transfers at issue before the
Fourth Circuit, Grayson urged the court to adopt an extra-statutory
Ponzi scheme exception to § 546 that would permit avoidance even if
the transfers qualified as "settlement payments" and would otherwise
be protected under the stockbroker defense.78 Grayson argued that
without an extra-statutory Ponzi scheme exception, "a broker [would
be allowed] to retain its ill-gotten profits," which "undermines the
equitable goals of the Bankruptcy Code."7 9
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit held that the commissions, fees,
and margin interest Derivium paid to Wachovia could be protected
under the stockbroker defense even though Wachovia charged
Derivium commissions at a substantially discounted rateso and even
though Derivium likely paid these commissions with Ponzi scheme
profits. In addition, the Fourth Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court's
novel test that the commissions could be protected as "settlement
payments" under the stockbroker defense as long as they are shown
to be reasonable and customary when settling securities
transactions." The court also refused to add an extra-statutory Ponzi
scheme exception to §546(e), reasoning that such an exception was
unnecessary given the current fraudulent transfer exceptions the
Code already provides.8 2
76. Derivium Capital,716 F.3d at 365.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 366.
79. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 51, Derivium Capital,716 F.3d 355 (No. 12-1518),
2012 WL 2360891, at *51.
80. Derivium Capital,716 F.3d at 364-65. Between September 1, 2002, and September
1, 2005, Bancroft paid Wachovia $359,842.51 in commissions, which averaged 0.34% of the
transaction value of the securities on the account, Optech paid $293,464.19, which
averaged 0.37% of the transaction value of the securities on the account, and WITCO paid
$52,562.72, which averaged 0.21% of the transaction value of the securities on the account.
Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Sec., LLC (In re Derivium Capital, LLC), No. 515042, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 577, at *6-9 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011). Thus, Wachovia received
commissions from the Stock Loan Entities totaling $705,869.42. In addition to the holdings
discussed, the Fourth Circuit also affirmed several other aspects of the district court's
decision: (1) the Customer Transfers were not transfers of Derivium's property; (2)
Wachovia was not the initial transferee of the Cash Transfers; (3) margin interest
payments qualified as "margin payments" under § 546(e); and (4) in pari delicto barred
Grayson's tort claims against Wachovia. Derivium Capital,716 F.3d at 363-67.
81. See Derivium Capital,716 F.3d at 364-65.
82. See id.
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In the end, the court never reached the issue of whether
Wachovia committed actual fraud under § 548(a)(1). 83 Thus, the court
permitted Wachovia to retain the commissions, fees, and margin
payments it received from an entity that operated a Ponzi scheme."
B.

The Fourth Circuit'sApproach: Broad Application of "Settlement
Payment"

In deciding whether Wachovia's commissions and fees
constituted "settlement payments" under the stockbroker defense,
the Fourth Circuit followed the methodology of other courts by
examining legislative intent and industry texts. The court noted, and
both parties agreed, that Congress's intent behind enacting § 546(e)
was to stabilize the securities market in the event of a major
bankruptcy.8 6 Moreover, the court concluded that an analysis of
industry texts was necessary because Congress included the phrase
"any other similar payment commonly used in the securities trade"
when defining the phrase "settlement payment.""
After examining two industry texts88 and Black's Law
Dictionary,89 the Fourth Circuit defined a "settlement payment" as a
"transfer of funds paid in connection with completing a securities
transaction."90 This broad definition of "settlement payment" aligned
with the definitions provided by the Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits." When applying this definition to Wachovia's transfers, the
court held that "Section 546(e)'s plain language, viewed through the
lens of its legislative intent, does not exclude commissions and fees

83. See id. at 366. The bankruptcy court did not reach the issue of whether Grayson
established a fraudulent transfer claim under § 548(a)(1)(A), finding it "not ripe for
determination." Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Sec., LLC (In re Derivium Capital,
LLC), 437 B.R. 798, 813 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2010), affd, 716 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2013).
84. Derivium Capital,716 F.3d at 366. These claims were later settled out of court. Id.
85. See id. at 364.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 363-64 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (2012)).
88. See id. at 364 (citing N.Y. STOCK EXCH., THE LANGUAGE OF INVESTING
GLOSSARY 30 (1983); GRP. OF THIRTY, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE
WORLD'S SECURITIES MARKETS 86 (1989)).

89. See id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 398 (9th ed. 2009)).
90. Id.
91. See id. (citing QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.), 571 F.3d
545, 549 (6th Cir. 2009); Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir.

2009); Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 515 (3d
Cir. 1999); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d
1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1991)).
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commonly paid to stockbrokers as part of settling a regular securities
transaction."'
Even though the Fourth Circuit defined "settlement payments"
broadly to include commissions, it did not apply this definition
without limitation. The court held that only commissions shown to be
reasonable and customary in the sale of stock are encompassed within
the definition of "settlement payments."9 3 For example, the court
provided that a commission payment for the solicitation of investors
would not be protected under the definition.9 4 In summary, by
examining the bankruptcy court's opinion, legislative intent, industry
texts, and definitions used by sister circuits, the Fourth Circuit
broadly defined "settlement payments" and was the first appellate
court to include commission payments found to be reasonable and
customary in the industry in that definition.
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS: A VAGUE BUT WORKABLE
STANDARD AND PROPER REFUSAL TO ADD AN EXTRA-STATUTORY
EXCEPTION

A.

Vague, yet Workable: How PartiesShould Interpret "Reasonable
and Customary"
The Fourth Circuit aligned with other circuits by defining

"settlement payments" broadly,95 but the Fourth Circuit's extension
of "settlement payments" to include commissions that are reasonable
92. Id. at 364-65.
93. See id. Along with commissions and fees paid to Wachovia, the trustee also sought
to avoid margin interest payments made to Wachovia that the bankruptcy court protected
as "margin payments" under § 546. See id. at 365. The interpretation and analysis of
"margin payments" is beyond the scope of this Recent Development. For purposes of this
analysis, it is only crucial to understand that the Fourth Circuit held that margin interest
payments qualified as "margin payments" under § 546(e) and thus could receive
protection under the stockbroker defense. See id. at 365-66; see also 11 U.S.C. § 741(5)
(2012) (defining "margin payment" as "payment or deposit of cash, a security, or other
property, that is commonly known to the securities trade as original margin, initial margin,
maintenance margin, or variation margin, or as a mark-to-market payment, or that secures
an obligation of a participant in a securities clearing agency"); Hays v. Morgan Stanley
DW Inc. (In re Stewart Fin. Co.), 367 B.R. 909, 917 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007) (applying a
broad definition of "margin payment").
94. Derivium Capital, 716 F.3d at 364. The court focused on the "closing" or "settling"
of trades and securities accounts to make the "settlement payments" determination. See
id. Arguably, when a commission payment is made for the solicitation of an investor, the
payment is being made for the acquisition of services, not the closing of a specific trade.
Therefore, these payments would not constitute "settlement payments" and would not be
protected under § 546(e). See id.
95. See supra Part II.B.
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and customary in the industry was neither based on the statutory text
of § 546(e) nor case law.96 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit has
established new law that extends the protection of the stockbroker
defense to commissions, but it also has a new standard "that requires
a stockbroker to take the additional evidentiary step of showing that
the commissions in question were reasonable and customary in the
industry."'

The Fourth Circuit based its establishment of new stockbroker
defense law on the legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court, but it
should have reviewed the bankruptcy court's conclusions in greater
depth. Generally, circuit courts are required to review legal
conclusions de novo in reviewing appeals from bankruptcy
proceedings.9 8 The definition of "settlement payment" is a matter of
statutory construction, and thus is a question of law, 99 yet the court
failed to apply that standard. To provide adequate de novo review,
the Fourth Circuit should have considered the application of the
stockbroker defense to commissions as if it had never been decided."o
However, in its analysis, the court relied only on its broad definition
of "settlement payments" and the inclusion by Black's Law
96. See Costella & Siracusa, supra note 19, at 64.
97. Id.
98. Derivium Capital, 716 F.3d at 360 (citing Goldman v. Capital City Mort. Corp. (In
re Nieves), 648 F.3d 232, 237 (4th Cir. 2011)). Considering a matter de novo requires the
court to "determine it anew, as if it had not been heard before and no decision had been
rendered. Properly defined, de novo treatment comprehends a new hearing." Yepes-Prado
v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 10 F.3d 1363, 1367 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal
citation omitted).
99. See, e.g., Enron Creditors II, 651 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2011). The Fourth Circuit's
reasonable and customary standard originated with the bankruptcy court's order in the
Derivium Capitallitigation. That court discussed the standard in its conclusions of law:
By order issued September 14, 2010, the Court determined that recovery of the
commissions at issue in this adversary proceeding may be barred as [a] matter of
law by the "stockbroker defense," as "payment[s] commonly made in the
securities industry," if they were reasonable and customary. Considering that the
application of the stockbroker defense to commissions appears to be one of first
impression, the Court, in an abundance of caution, sought facts to ensure that the
commissions at issue were not unusually high or in variance with commissions
commonly received in the industry. In expressing that inquiry, the Court
articulated the "reasonable and customary" standard. It does not appear in the
language of the statute.
Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Sec., LLC (In re Derivium Capital, LLC), No. 515042, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 577, at *&7 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011), aff'd, 716 F.3d 355 (4th Cir.
2013).
100. See, e.g., United States v. George, 971 F.2d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1992) ("By
definition, de novo review entails consideration of an issue as if it had not been decided
previously.").
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Dictionary of a "broker's commission" as an example of a
"transaction cost" before concluding that commissions qualify as
"settlement payments."10 The court's analysis hardly seems to rise to
the level of considering the issue "anew."" If the Fourth Circuit had
analyzed the bankruptcy court's legal conclusions in greater depth, it
could have provided more insight into how lower courts and litigants
should apply the stockbroker defense to commissions.
At first glance, the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the stockbroker
defense seems to contribute to the defense's convolutedness. The
court added two inherently abstract concepts-"reasonable" and
"customary"-to an already obscure doctrine. Without more insight
into what exactly constitutes reasonable and customary in the
industry, the court's ruling is vague and overly broad. In future
litigation, parties and lower courts attempting to apply the Fourth
Circuit's holding will have little knowledge about which transactions
would be considered reasonable and customary and which evidentiary
steps to take to meet the standard. The court could have avoided
some potential confusion that may result from its ruling by analyzing
the bankruptcy court's establishment of the reasonable and
customary standard for commissions in greater depth.
Even though the Fourth Circuit's adoption of this new
stockbroker defense may appear overly vague and broad, when
applied in practice, it should act as a benefit to stockbrokers, thus
conforming to Congress's intent for enacting § 546(e).103 Parties and
lower courts attempting to discern the Fourth Circuit's ruling and
obtain insight into the application of the reasonable and customary
standard should review the factual findings of the bankruptcy court in
Derivium Capital.10

When the Fourth Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court's factual
findings, it recognized that when settling the stock transactions at
issue, Wachovia charged commissions to Derivium at substantially
discounted rates.os Nevertheless, the court upheld these commissions

101. See Derivium Capital,716 F.3d at 364 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 398 (9th
ed. 2009)).
102. See Yepes-Prado, 10 F.3d at 1367 n.5.
103. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional intent
underlying the stockbroker defense).
104. Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Sec., LLC (In re Derivium Capital, LLC),
No. 5-15042, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 577, at *3-9 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011), aff'd, 716 F.3d 355
(4th Cir. 2013).
105. See Derivium Capital, 716 F.3d at 365. Wachovia representatives testified that
approximately fifty to seventy-five percent of Wachovia's clients received discounted rates
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as reasonable and customary because an industry representative
testified at the bankruptcy court evidentiary hearing that they were
"fair, reasonable, and customary and well within the ... FINRA

[Financial Industry Regulatory Authority], NASD [National
Association of Securities Dealers] rules."1 o6 Therefore, it seems that
parties and lower courts should look to industry resources such as
FINRA and NASD rules or expert testimony in order to decide
whether a "settlement payment" qualifies as reasonable and
customary in the industry. For example, Wachovia's representative
testified that a substantial portion of its clients receive commission
discounts, thus providing evidence that the commissions at issue were
customary. 10 7 In addition, the bankruptcy court explained that NASD
rules require commissions to be "fair," which usually means they do
not exceed 5% of the transaction amount and discounts are permitted
as long as they are "in variance in with commissions commonly
received in the industry." 1 s Even though the bankruptcy court's
factual findings do not offer comprehensive guidance as to how to
apply the reasonable and customary standard to commissions, they
should give direction to parties attempting to argue whether certain
commissions qualify as "settlement payments" under the stockbroker
defense.
Likely, the commissions that lower courts will consider
reasonable and customary will be determined by practice. Perhaps
what is reasonable and customary will depend on the type of account,
length of relationship between the parties, or specific volume of
business expected."0 ' Litigants should be prepared to provide

at anywhere between five and ninety-five percent discounts. Id. Brokerage firms may offer
steep discounts to clients to attract a large amount of business. See id.
106. Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
NASD was the former name of the regulating agency for securities firms, which combined
with the New York Stock Exchange member regulation operations to form FINRA in
2007. See News Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to
Form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority - FINRA (July 30, 2007), available at
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/p036329. FINRA is a not-for-profit
organization authorized by Congress to regulate the securities industry by "writing and
enforcing rules governing the activities of more than 4,100 securities firms with
approximately 635,800 brokers; examining firms for compliance with those rules; fostering
market
transparency; and educating investors."
About FINRA, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Mar. 25,2014).
107. See Derivium Capital,716 F. 3d at 365.
108. Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Sec., LLC (In re Derivium Capital, LLC),
No. 5-15042, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 577, at *11 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011).
109. See id. at *4-5. In its findings of fact, the bankruptcy court noted that "[d]iscounts
of 60% or higher from a firm's standard commission rate were not unusual for, among
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evidence to support their arguments regarding commissions under the
reasonable and customary standard-potentially, this will entail
consulting an expert witness or other industry resources. In Derivium
Capital, only Wachovia provided expert testimony, and, coincidence
or not, Wachovia prevailed.110 If this result is any indication of the
weight courts will give to expert testimony when making the
reasonable and customary determination, parties should seek out
experts to help make their cases. Therefore, while the reasonable and
customary standard may appear vague on its face, subsequent case
law should work out the nuances of the standard.
B.

The Fourth CircuitCorrectly Declined to Create a Ponzi Scheme
Exception

The Fourth Circuit's refusal to establish an extra-statutory Ponzi
scheme exception to § 546(e) suggests that protection for
stockbrokers was one of its foremost considerations.' In its decision,
the court relied on the Ponzi scheme presumption and express
exception for fraudulent transfers" 2 to uphold the Code's equitable
goals. Adoption of an extra-statutory Ponzi scheme exception to
§ 546 in Derivium Capital would have permitted avoidance of the
commissions, fees, and margin interest payments Derivium paid to
Wachovia even if they otherwise qualified as "settlement payments,"
thus barring the application of the stockbroker defense."' Unlike the
Ponzi scheme presumption, an extra-statutory Ponzi scheme would
apply even in the absence of actual fraud. Presumably, an extrastatutory Ponzi scheme exception would override the stockbroker
defense, forgoing the need for a trustee to establish the existence of a
Ponzi scheme to evoke the Ponzi scheme presumption in order to
assume actual fraud.
Given the existence of the Ponzi scheme presumption and
exception for fraudulent transfers under § 548(a)(1), the Fourth
Circuit correctly refused to add an extra-statutory Ponzi scheme
exception to the stockbroker defense. An extra-statutory Ponzi
scheme exception to the stockbroker defense is both unnecessary,

others, large clients who conducted, or were expected to conduct, a significant volume of
business with a full service brokerage firm." Id.
110. See Derivium Capital,716 F.3d at 365.
111. See id. at 366 ("Grayson fails to convince us we need to establish an extrastatutory fraud exception to the stockbroker defense.").
112. See id.
113. See id.
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and, more importantly, would disrupt the balance between the goals
of the Code and securities law.
An extra-statutory Ponzi scheme exception is unnecessary
because the stockbroker defense already excludes fraudulent
transfers in two specific ways. As explained by the court, a statutory
exception applies when actual fraud can be proven.'14 Next, and most
important in this case, Ponzi scheme transfers inherently will be
excluded from the industry meaning of "settlement payment.""' A
Ponzi scheme transfer can never be considered reasonable and
customary because it is marked by fraud. By its very nature, "a
transaction bearing badges of fraud will rarely be one that a market
participant would call customary."116 In order to conceal the fraud,
parties involved will "resort to unusual combinations of contracts"
and take abnormal measures during the transaction."' Under the
Fourth Circuit's new reasonable and customary test for commissions,
a Ponzi scheme transaction would necessarily be excluded because
the fraud underlying the transaction would be atypical for the
securities industry, and thus could not be considered reasonable and
customary. Therefore, an additional extra-statutory Ponzi scheme
exception to the stockbroker defense is unnecessary.
Furthermore, such an exception would disrupt the balance
between the goals of bankruptcy and securities law. The tension
between these goals is most evident in the relationship between the
Code's stockbroker defense and fraudulent transfer exception."' The
stockbroker defense exists to stabilize the securities market, while the
fraudulent transfer exception exists to remedy securities fraud."9
When applying these provisions, courts are aware of the need to
balance both goals. The Second Circuit has aptly characterized the
issue: "By restricting a bankruptcy trustee's power to recover
payments that are otherwise avoidable under the Bankruptcy Code,
the safe harbor stands 'at the intersection of two important national
legislative policies on a collision course-the policies of bankruptcy

114. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2012). An exception to the stockbroker defense also
exists when transfers are found to be constructively fraudulent. See id. § 548(a)(1)(B).
115. See Rothschild, supra note 22, at 1405 (citations omitted).
116. Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, FinancialContractsand the New Bankruptcy
Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 641, 659 & n.115 (2005) (citing Kipperman v. Circle Trust F.B.O. (In re
Grafton Partners, L.P.), 321 B.R. 527, 540 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005)).
117. Id. at 659.
118. See Rothschild, supra note 22, at 1377-78.
119. Id.
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and securities law.' "120 If courts established an extra-statutory Ponzi
scheme exception, the goals of bankruptcy law would be given
preference. In effect, an extra-statutory Ponzi scheme exception
would disrupt this balance by favoring the goals of bankruptcy law
over those of securities law, thus destroying the very harmony courts
should aim to preserve when applying the stockbroker defense.12 1
IV. BROKERAGE FIRMS, BREATHE EASIER: SUGGESTIONS AND
OUTLOOK AFTER DERIVIUM CAPITAL

In this case of first impression for the Fourth Circuit, the court's
broad application of "settlement payments" strengthened the
protections of the Code for brokerage firms against fraudulent
transfer claims in the Ponzi scheme context.122 In effect, brokerage
firms now will be able to retain commissions, margin payments, and
other fees associated with a transaction as long as they are reasonable
and customary in the securities industry-even in the context of an
alleged Ponzi scheme. 2 3 Presently, the Fourth Circuit is the first and
only court to extend the protections of the stockbroker defense to
commission payments and to adopt the "reasonable and customary in
the industry" standard, and it remains to be seen whether other courts
adopt this standard as well.124

120. Enron Creditors II, 651 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Lowenschuss v.
Resorts Int'l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 515 (3d Cir. 1999)).
121. See Kipperman v. Circle Trust F.B.O. (In re Grafton Partners, L.P.), 321 B.R. 527,
538 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he statutory protection of settlement payments
presupposes that securities laws are not being offended. In other words, Public Law 97222 operated to coordinate and harmonize the securities laws and the Bankruptcy
Code."); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (describing the enactment of
§ 546(e)).
122. See Kathy Bazoian Phelps, Fourth Circuit Makes New Fraudulent Transfer Law,
PONZI SCHEME BLOG (June 19, 2013), http://www.theponzibook.blogspot.com/2013/06
/fourth-circuit-makes-new-fraudulent.html.
123. See Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Sec., LLC (In re Derivium Capital
LLC), 716 F.3d 355, 364-66 (4th Cir. 2013).
124. Costella & Siracusa, supranote 19, at 64. For example, the Second Circuit refused
to require that "settlement payments" be "commonly used in the securities industry."
Enron CreditorsII, 651 F.3d at 336. The court reasoned:
[A]pplication of the safe harbor in every case [would] depend on a factual
determination regarding the commonness of a given transaction. It is not clear
whether that determination would depend on the economic rationality of the
transaction, its frequency in the marketplace, signs of an intent to favor certain
creditors ... or some other factor. This reading of the statute would result in
commercial uncertainty and unpredictability at odds with the safe harbor's
purpose and in an area of law where certainty and predictability are at a premium.
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The Fourth Circuit's holding in Derivium Capital was just one
example of how courts are broadening the definition of "settlement
payments" under the stockbroker defense. However, going forward,
courts should be wary of expanding this definition to an even greater
degree. Because Congress "intended the safe harbors to protect the
market from systematic risks by providing stability, consistency, and
clarity,"125 courts should seek to provide stability, consistency, and
clarity when applying safe harbor law.
When courts inappropriately broaden the definitions and
interpretations of crucial safe harbors, they risk undermining the
purpose of these provisions. When a statute's plain language is
ambiguous, courts consider legislative intent or legislative history.126
The plain language of § 546 is undoubtedly ambiguous,' yet since
Congress enacted § 546(e) in 1978, courts have continued to expand
its scope far beyond the original congressional intent. 28 Congress
intended the stockbroker defense to reduce systematic risk in the
financial market by preventing the insolvency of one firm from
disrupting the market as a whole.12 9 However, some courts are now
applying the stockbroker defense when there is little to no risk the
transactions would impact the market at all. 3 0 By applying the
stockbroker defense to insignificant transactions, to which Congress
did not intend for the defense to apply, courts move further away
from using the safe harbor as a tool to promote market stability. In
doing so, courts untether the exception from its justification.''
Therefore, courts should only apply the stockbroker defense to cases
Id. Similarly, in Kaiser Steel, the Tenth Circuit held that payments in connection with a
leveraged buyout constituted "settlement payments" under § 546(e) even though the
leveraged buyout may not be a "routine" securities trade. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl
Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d 1230, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 1991).
125. Kim, supra note 1, at 693.
126. See Hoffman v. Comshare, Inc. (In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Lit.), 183 F.3d 542, 549
(6th Cir. 1999).
127. See supraPart I.A.
128. See George V. Utlik & Schuyler G. Carroll, The Safe Harbor Provided for
"Settlement Payments" by Section 546(e), 19 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 321, 331
(2010).
129. See supra Part I.A.
130. See, e.g., Cyganowski v. Lapides (In re Batavia Nursing Home, LLC), Bankr. Nos.
11-13223 K, 11-13225 K, Adv. No. 12-1145 K, 2013 WL 3934237, at *1, *2 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013) (holding that § 546(e) could be applied to protect $1.2 million at
issue in leveraged buyout of privately held securities even though the amount "seems to be
far more remote from the 'financial markets' than [another case involving $106 million]").
131. Cf Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (declining to adopt a broad interpretation
of an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement because doing so would
"untether the [exception] from [its] justifications").
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in line with congressional intent and only protect "settlement
payments" from avoidance when doing so would actually stabilize the
financial market.
The inconsistency with which courts have interpreted
"settlement payments" under the stockbroker defense, coupled with
the increasing number of bankruptcy proceedings, act as a call to
Congress or the Supreme Court to provide some finality on the issue.
Either Congress will have to clarify the ambiguous definition of
"settlement payment" provided in the Code or the Supreme Court
will have to set a concrete standard for applying this safe harbor
provision.132 In the interim, it remains to be seen how courts will
interpret "settlement payments" in the Ponzi scheme context
following the Fourth Circuit's establishment of new fraudulent
transfer law. As one commentator noted, until then, "Section 546(e)
will remain one of the most controversial provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code in bankruptcy litigation, and the settlement
payment defense will continue to serve as a transferee's most
effective weapon.""'
CONCLUSION

By determining that commissions, fees, and margin payments
qualified as "settlement payments" under the stockbroker defense,
the Fourth Circuit contributed to the broadening application of
§ 546(e). In doing so, the court also created a new standardreasonable and customary in the industry-that requires stockbrokers
to take an extra step in proving that they should be able to retain the
underlying commissions paid by a debtor in bankruptcy proceedings.
Currently, it is unclear exactly how stockbrokers will prove a
transaction was reasonable and customary. Even with this
uncertainty, they still came out ahead in Derivium Capital because
the standard appears to be extremely generous given that substantial
discounts passed under the test.'" Therefore, unless the transactions
are specifically avoided under § 548(a)(1), brokerage firms will be
able to keep these "settlement payments" even if the transactions are
associated with a Ponzi scheme.
132. See Richardson, supra note 39, at 46.
133. Michael Klein, Briefly: A Defendant's Best Friend in Fraudulent Transfer Cases,
TURNAROUND MGMT. Ass'N (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.turnaround.org/Publications
/Articles.aspx?objectlD=13756.
134. In Derivium Capital, Wachovia's industry representative testified that Wachovia
clients received discounts of up to ninety-five percent. Grayson Consulting, Inc. v.
Wachovia Sec., LLC (In re Derivium Capital LLC), 716 F.3d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 2013).
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The Fourth Circuit utilized an unprecedented approach to
applying the stockbroker defense that extended the definition of
"settlement payments" to include broker commissions shown to be
reasonable and customary in the industry. However, it will be up to
lower courts to discern what amounts qualify as reasonable and
customary in the industry and how parties can satisfy the standard.
With an increasing number of courts applying the stockbroker
defense in conflicting ways, and Ponzi scheme litigation on the rise,
eventually either Congress or the Supreme Court should decide the
proper application of this safe harbor provision.
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